<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Razao on Scholion</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/tags/razao/</link><description>Recent content in Razao on Scholion</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>pt-BR</language><copyright>© 2026</copyright><lastBuildDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 21:26:22 +0100</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://scholion.thluiz.com/tags/razao/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/shaw-reasonable-man-adapts/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 08:51:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/shaw-reasonable-man-adapts/</guid><description>Maxim 124 do apêndice Maxims for Revolutionists, em Man and Superman (1903). Shaw inverte a noção comum de razoabilidade para defender o inadaptado como motor histórico.</description></item><item><title>L'esprit est toujours la dupe du coeur</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/larochefoucauld-esprit-dupe-coeur/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 14:34:05 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/larochefoucauld-esprit-dupe-coeur/</guid><description>Maxime 102. O intelecto, posto a serviço do desejo, não chega a perceber que está sendo manipulado por afetos que se apresentam como razões.</description></item><item><title>Les querelles ne dureraient pas longtemps, si le tort n'était que d'un côté</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/larochefoucauld-querelles-tort-cote/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 14:34:05 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/larochefoucauld-querelles-tort-cote/</guid><description>Maxime 496. As discussões persistem porque há culpa nos dois lados — o que mantém o conflito é a parte de razão de cada um.</description></item><item><title>Mehr Vernunft ist in deinem Leibe als in deiner besten Weisheit</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/nietzsche-mehr-vernunft-im-leibe/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 12:41:59 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/nietzsche-mehr-vernunft-im-leibe/</guid><description>De Also sprach Zarathustra I, Von den Verächtern des Leibes (1883). Há mais razão no teu corpo do que na tua maior sabedoria.</description></item><item><title>Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/pascal-coeur-raisons-raison-ne-connait-point/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 11:58:37 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/pascal-coeur-raisons-raison-ne-connait-point/</guid><description>Dos Pensées #277 (Brunschvicg). Pascal sustenta uma forma de conhecimento afetivo, anterior e independente da inferência lógica.</description></item><item><title>Nous connaissons la vérité non seulement par la raison, mais encore par le cœur</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/pascal-verite-par-raison-et-par-coeur/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 11:58:37 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/pascal-verite-par-raison-et-par-coeur/</guid><description>Dos Pensées #282 (Brunschvicg). Pascal complementa a tese do cœur a ses raisons (#277) com uma epistemologia dual: razão e intuição.</description></item><item><title>La foi consiste à croire ce que la raison ne croit pas</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/voltaire-faith-believing-what-reason-cannot/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 11:41:54 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/voltaire-faith-believing-what-reason-cannot/</guid><description>Do verbete Foi do Dictionnaire philosophique portatif (1764). Definição deliberadamente paradoxal que ataca a noção cristã de fé como virtude epistêmica.</description></item><item><title>Prejudice is an opinion without judgement</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/voltaire-prejudice-opinion-without-judgement/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 11:41:54 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/voltaire-prejudice-opinion-without-judgement/</guid><description>Do verbete Préjugés do Dictionnaire philosophique portatif (1764). Definição operacional do preconceito como opinião pré-fabricada que dispensa exame.</description></item><item><title>Quiconque peut vous faire croire des absurdités peut vous faire commettre des injustices</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/voltaire-believe-absurdities-commit-injustices/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 11:41:54 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/voltaire-believe-absurdities-commit-injustices/</guid><description>Das Questions sur les miracles (1765). A versão definitiva de um argumento que Voltaire repetiu em vários textos, ligando obediência intelectual a abusos políticos.</description></item><item><title>As soon as we abandon our own reason, and are content to rely upon authority, there is no end to our troubles</title><link>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/abandon-our-own-reason-rely-upon-authority/</link><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 17:49:27 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://scholion.thluiz.com/notes/abandon-our-own-reason-rely-upon-authority/</guid><description>De Unpopular Essays (1950), coletânea polêmica de Russell. O argumento de autoridade aparece como raiz comum de erros morais e políticos.</description></item></channel></rss>